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I. INTRODUCTION
At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly of the United
Nations decided to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in
Vienna in 1986 to negotiate a convention on the law of treaties to
which one or more international organizations are parties.1 The
delegates to this conference will have as a basis of discussion a set
of draft articles, prepared by the United Nations International
Law Commission over a period of twelve years.2
After reviewing the history of this codification work, one may
conclude that even though discussions on the existence of an inter-
national legal personality for international organizations seemed
closed with the 1949 Advisory Opinion on "Reparations for Inju-
ries" by the International Court of Justice, 3 and even though these
organizations in reality participate in international legal relations
together with states, differences of opinion on the character, and in
particular the scope, of this international personality still exist.4
The subject of this article is limited to the law of treaties involving international inter-
governmental organizations, i.e., organizations established by a treaty between states. Exter-
nal relations of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) or other subjects of international
law remain outside of the scope of this study.
2 See Question of Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations or
Between Two or More International Organizations, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 137, U.N.
Doc. a/CN.4/SER.A/1979 (texts of all draft articles as adopted by the Commission) [herein-
after cited as 1979 Draft Articles].
3 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174.
4 On the various theories on the subject of the legal character and scope of the interna-
tional legal personality of international organizations an extensive literature exists. Those
theories may, on one end of the spectrum, be founded on a legal personality which is derived
exclusively from the will of the member states, and which favors, via the theory of implied
powers, near equality with states in international legal relations. Whatever the theory be-
hind it, however, the participation of international organizations in international legal rela-
tionships has become a daily reality. See D. Vignes, The Impact of International Organiza-
tions on the Development and Application of International Law, THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 809-55, at 833-34 (R. MacDonald and D. Johnston eds.)
(1983). The importance of the participation of international organizations in international
relations is still growing; their total number of 37 organizations in 1909 has grown to 179 in
1964, and to 365 today-a growth of 100% during the last twenty years. YEARBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1984-85, (Brussels 1985).
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Indeed, perplexing questions with regard to both the external rela-
tions of international organizations and their treaty-making capac-
ity abound.
The prevailing opinion holds that the power of an international
organization to enter legal relationships is always limited by the
organization's constitution and other internal instruments because
the separate legal personality of the organization is based on these
provisions.5 This also means that a fundamental inequality be-
tween international organizations makes it very difficult, if not im-
possible, to draft general rules applicable to all organizations. A
second problem concerns the question of representation. The ques-
tion of who is authorized to negotiate and to enter agreements
binding the organization is crucial, although in some cases impossi-
ble to answer. Additional inquiry should be made into the consti-
tutionality of the present practice in this area. Additionally, if
agreements concluded by organs of an international organization,
such as its Secretary General, are binding on the organization, to
what extent are they binding on its member states?'
The answer to these questions depends not so much on the sta-
tus and recognition of an organization in and by the international
community, but mainly on the division of power within the organi-
zation itself as to both the decision-making process and the organi-
B The International Court, in its "Reparations for Injuries" opinion, supra note 3, speaks
about "a large measure of international personality" which the organization needs to be able
to exercise its functions under the Charter: "[U]nder international law, the Organization
must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter,
are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties." 1949 I.C.J. 1982. However, it is sometimes maintained that the capacity of interna-
tional organizations to enter into external relations is limited not by their nature or by
provisions of their constitution, but solely because their functions are limited, and the need
is not (yet?) as keenly felt as is the case with states. See F. Seyerstedt, Treaty-Making
Capacity of Intergovernmental Organizations: Article 6 of the International Law Commis-
sion's Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organiza-
tions or Between International Organizations, 34 OSTERR. Z. OFFENTL. RECHT UND VOLKER-
RECHT 261-67, at 262 (1983) (further discussed in text accompanying infra notes 88-93).
" The OAU Council of Ministers, for instance, has at one time reprimanded its Secretary-
General and accused him of having overstepped his mandate in connection with the conclu-
sion of agreements of cooperation with certain UN organs and organizations. In November
1966, then Secretary-General Diallo Telli was criticized severely by the Council for having
surpassed his mandate and his administrative role in having concluded, in the name of the
organization, agreements with the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and with the
International Labour Organization. The Council felt that this matter fell entirely within its
own competence. See N. SYBESMA-KNOL, THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS,
at 112-13 (1981). As regards the question of whether the organization is bound by agree-
ments entered into ultra vires by certain officials, see text accompanying infra notes 68-119.
1985]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
zation's external policy. This division of power is in constant
change, for it is related to one of the fundamental problems under-
lying the law of international organizations. On the one hand, it
has become clear that the great problems of society can no longer
be solved by one state alone; an increasing interdependence neces-
sitates international cooperation, and perhaps even, integration.
On the other hand, states still hesitate, or even refuse to relinquish
even the smallest segment of what they consider their national sov-
ereignty. The scope of the participation of international organiza-
tions in international legal relations thus is being continuously
challenged from two sides: from the outside world, where histori-
cally only states have held "full powers," and also from within,
where member states are constantly on guard against both loss of
sovereignty and against any consequences the activities of the or-
ganization might bring for them.7 The outcome of this dual chal-
lenge will eventually determine the character and scope of the par-
ticipation of international organizations as partners in
international legal relationships.
II. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE WORK
OF THE UNITED NATIONS' INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
In two advisory opinions8 the Court of International Justice
dealt extensively with the question of the status and competence
of a specific international organization, namely, the United Na-
tions. Both opinions have played a determinant role in the devel-
opment of general. legal norms for this new phenomenon on the
international stage, the international organization."
The most prolonged and extensive discussions on this subject
have taken place within the framework of the United Nations' In-
ternational Law Commission.10 The Commission assists the Gen-
eral Assembly in its task of promoting "the progressive develop-
ment of international law and its codification."" The Commission
D. Vignes, supra note 4, at 834; see N. SYBESMA-KNOL, supra note 6, at 80.
"Reparations for Injuries," supra note 3; see also Certain Expenses of the United Na-
tions, 1962 I.C.J. 151.
1 See M. Lachs, Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of Jus-
tice to the Development of International Law, 10 SYR. J. INr'L L. & COMM. 239, 251-54
(1983).
10 This commission, established by the General Assembly in 1947, now consists of thirty-
four highly qualified and internationally renowned specialists in the field of international
law.
" See U.N. CHARTER art. 13.
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is empowered to "survey the whole field of international law with a
view to selecting topics for codification ... ."' Reviewing the his-
tory of the work of the Commission reveals that it has played a
major role in the codification of international law on many sub-
jects.'3 These "topics for codification" usually are selected by
members of the Commission. Sometimes, however, the General As-
sembly proposes a certain subject it considers particularly impor-
tant. Thus, in 1958, the General Assembly suggested to the Com-
mission consideration of the question of the "Relations between
States and International Organizations." In fact, since 1962 when
the Commission appointed Professor Abdullah El-Erian as its first
Special Rapporteur for this subject, 14 the question of "Relations
between States and International Organizations" has remained on
its agenda.
In the meantime, the work on the first part of the topic, the
question of the representation of states before international orga-
nizations, resulted in a codification conference in Vienna in 1975
and the adoption of the "Vienna Convention on the Representa-
tion of States in their Relations with International Organizations
of a Universal Character."' 5 The second part of the topic was
placed on the agenda of the Commission in 1976's and a Special
Rapporteur was appointed to study the question of the "status,
privileges and immunities of international organizations" in the
broadest sense. 17
From the beginning of discussions concerning delimitation of the
' Article 18 of the statute of the Commission.
"a On the Commission's work in general, see H. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION (1965); B. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW .COMMISSION: ITS APPROACH TO THE
CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (The Hague 1977);
UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (3d ed. 1980). The
most important sources for a study of the Commission's work are its yearbooks, which con-
tain records of meetings, reports, draft texts, and the Commission's reports to the General
Assembly.
11 Following the election of Professor EI-Erian to the International Court of Justice, Mr.
Leonardo Diaz Gonzalez was appointed Special Rapporteur on this topic in 1979.
"s The Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with Inter-
national Organizations of a Universal Character, Vienna 1975. The convention has not yet
entered into force, among other reasons due to the fact that some of its provisions are of a
controversial character (namely part III on the status of permanent representatives of ob-
servers (international organizations and liberation movements), and two resolutions, inter
alia, on the representation of liberation movements, annexed to the Final Act of the
Conference).
"0 Because of its heavy schedule with regard to its work on other topics, this subject has
not yet been discussed by the Commission.
17 [1973] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 298, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/156/1963/Add. 1.
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scope of the subject, the question arose whether the problem of the
international legal personality of international organizations would
be included. In response, Professor El-Erian recommended, in his
initial report on the first part of the topic, consideration of the
general principles of legal personality, such as legal capacity,
treaty-making capacity, and the capacity to bring international
claims.18 During the 1963 session of the Commission, however, the
members of the Commission decided to reject Professor El-Erian's
recommendation.1" The Commission had already faced that ques-
tion, at least indirectly, in the course of its work on the draft-con-
vention on high seas.2 0 In essence, therefore, the issue of interna-
tional legal personality of international organizations has been
dealt with by the Commission explicitly only in the context of and,
as a consequence of, its work on the codification of the Law of
Treaties.
III. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF TREATIES
At its first session in 1949, the Commission included the law of
treaties in its list of subjects to be considered.21 Thereafter, the
Commission dedicated the larger part of its time and efforts, espe-
cially during the 1962 to 1966 period, to the codification of the law
of treaties.22 In 1961, when Sir Humphrey Waldock became Special
Rapporteur,25 the Commission combined the various studies and
reports into a draft convention. In 1966, the draft was sent to the
General Assembly's Sixth Committee for discussion, with the re-
s Id. The Special Rapporteur also discussed in detail the codification efforts during the
League of Nations era on the subject of the law of international organizations.
'9 Ramcharan, supra note 13, at 153-54.
0 Id. at 154. See also B. De Schutter, The United States Flag, a Full-Fledged Seaflag?
Legal Status of Ships Employed in the Official Service of an International Organization, 1
STUDIES EN VOORDRACHTEN VAN DE VRIJE UN1VERsrrEIT BRUssEL 39 (1963).
Draft article 67 of the convention, dealing with the flag and the flag-state, provided that
"the provisions of the preceding articles do not prejudice the question of the ships employed
in the official service of an inter-governmental organization flying the flag of the organiza-
tion." The Commission must have considered this a real possibility, with far reaching legal
consequences. The draft articles eventually became the Convention on the High Seas (Ge-
neva 1958).
21 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VI-
ENNA CONVENTION 33 (1970).
" Id. at 33-41.
23 Id. at 34. Several Special Rapporteurs have reported on this topic: Briefly (four reports,
1950-52), Lauterpacht (two reports, 1953-54), Fitzmaurice (five reports, 1956-61), and
Waldock (seven reports, 1962-66).
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quest that the Assembly convene a conference of plenipotentiaries
to discuss the draft and adopt a definitive text of the convention.
2 4
In the earlier stages, limiting the scope of the codification and
convening a convention were important aspects of the codification
effort. One by one various aspects were excluded from the topic,
such as the effect of the outbreak of hostilities on existing treaty
obligations,2" recognition of states,26 state responsibility, 7 the
question of the most-favored nation clause,28 and the interpreta-
tion of United Nations Charter provisions.29 None of these aspects,
however, were fundamental problems per se on the law of treaties.
The real issue arose because existing treaty law had, as all interna-
tional law tends to do, developed in and by state practice.30 Until
recently, a treaty could be defined as "an agreement concluded be-
tween two or more states." Today, a different kind of agreement,
one in which international organizations are involved, must also be
considered in the definition. It seemed natural that the Commis-
sion would include this new type of treaty in the "entire subject of
the law of treaties" under consideration. 31 Initially, the Commis-
sion assumed that an eventual convention would also apply to this
new kind of treaty, although the first drafts referred only to
"states" as possible parties to international agreements.32 In 1962,
the Commission adopted a definition of the word "treaty" to be
used in the draft articles, providing that the term "treaty" would
refer not only to agreements concluded between two or more
states, but also to agreements concluded between states and inter-
national organizations, or between two or more international orga-
s' S. ROSENNE, supra note 22, at 34.
"5 This subject was dealt with in a separate convention, the Vienna Convention on Suc-
cession of States in Respect of Treaties, adopted at a Conference in Vienna in 1977-78. For
a summary report on the history of this convention, see UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note 13 at 59-63; see also United Nations Confer-
ence on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Vienna, April 4 - May 6, 1977 and July
31 - August 23, 1978 (official records vols. I, II, & III).
26 This topic, although considered important, was not given priority. S. ROSENNE, supra
note 22, at 42; see also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
" Since 1955, state responsibility has been on the agenda of the Commission as a separate
topic for codification. The Special Rapporteur at the time was F.V. Garcia Amador, who
after being elected to the International Court of Justice was succeeded by W. Riphagen. See
THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 80-88.
'" This topic was placed on the Commission's agenda in 1967. Special Rapporteur at the
time was Endre Ustor. See id. at 73-77; S. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 231.
29 S. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 42.
'0 Id. at 44.
11 Id. at 44-45 (n.41 and accompanying text).
'3 Id. at 44-45.
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nizations3 5 With regard to the definition of the phrase "capacity to
conclude treaties," the Commission stated that the capacity of an
international organization would depend on the relevant constitu-
tional provisions of the organization."'
Nevertheless, in the course of the Commission's discussions dur-
ing the 1963 and 1964 sessions, it became clear that a strong oppo-
sition against this "equal treatment" of organizations and states
existed.5 This opposition became manifest not only within the
Commission, but also in the General Assembly. As a result, all
references to international organizations were deleted from the re-
ports and drafts of the Commission, namely from the draft articles
defining "treaties 3 7 and delimiting treaty-making capacity.38 Fur-
thermore, a preliminary draft article 0 expressly stated that draft
articles referred only to agreements between states. 9 In making
these changes, the Commission reasoned that the draft articles
were generally based on existing state practice, and that detailed
study of the practice with regard to treaties involving international
organizations would be necessary before the Commission could
proceed with the codification of such practice. 40 The Commission
also recognized that codifying general principles of the law of trea-
ties could be accomplished only if the scope of the subject re-
mained limited to treaties between states."
Many members of the International Law Commission considered
this decision a step backwards in the development of the law of
international organization. 2 Yet, in retrospect, it may not have
been an entirely negative decision to avoid the inclusion of such a
delicate subject in the codification proposals for the law of treaties.
33 Id. at 44-46.
'4 See Report of the I.L.C. to the General Assembly, 14 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n at 1-
11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/144 and add.1 (1962).
35 S. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 41-46.
SO A similar controversy became apparent during the discussions on the legal conse-
quences of an international organization's acting as a "Flag-State" in the course of the pre-
paratory work on the High Seas Convention. See supra note 20.
" Compare Report 1962, chptr. II, arts. 1, 1(a), & 3 with 1965 text, arts. 1, 1(a), & 2. For
added emphasis in the 1965 text, the Commission included a new article, then numbered
article 0, expressly limiting the scope of the articles to treaties concluded between states
(retained, although further modified, in the Vienna Convention, arts. 1, 2, 1(a), & 3). S.
ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 45 nn. 43 & 45.
38 Id.
39 Id.; see [1965] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 159, U.N. Doc. a/600g.
,0 [1965] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 39, at 158.
41 Id.
" S. ROSENNE, supra note 21, at 46.
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First, it is extremely important, as it was in the 1960's, to support
the United Nations' codification efforts. Success was, and is, not
self-evident, and postponement of the consideration of questions
clearly not yet ready for codification or of a politically controver-
sial character may in the end benefit the development of interna-
tional law. Second, it was important for the Commission to achieve
a speedy codification of the general principles of the law of trea-
ties. Since the codification of these principles, treaties have become
the primary source of international law in both importance and
quantity.
The question of treaties involving international organizations
came up again at the Conference of Vienna 3 where the Commis-
sion's draft was discussed and the "Treaty of Treaties" was
adopted." During one of the first sessions of the conference, the
delegate from the United States pointed out that draft article I, in
excluding from the scope of the convention treaties concluded by
international organizations, took into account neither the develop-
ment of international law which had taken place during the twenti-
eth century, nor the growth of activities of international organiza-
tions which clearly possess treaty-making capacity and play
important roles in the modern international community.45 The
United States delegate proposed establishment of a working group
of representatives from selected international organizations to
study the question and to formulate proposals for necessary
changes in the text of the draft convention. A number of delegates,
including those from Cyprus, Australia, and Great Britain sup-
ported this proposal.4" The Soviet representative and others, how-
43 See R. WETZEL & D. RANSCHNING, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
(1978) (text of convention in English and German, with bibliography); 1979 Draft Articles,
supra note 2; see also Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of
the thirty-fourth session, U.N. Doc. A/37/10, reprinted in [1982] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1077,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2) (containing the text of the draft articles with
commentary) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Draft Articles].
" See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
" Even then, international organizations of a universal character, such as the League of
Nations, United Nations, and more specialized agencies had already concluded hundreds of
treaties. This number has increased greatly by the conclusion of agreements by regional
organizations such as the European Communities.
" Official Records of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties (First Session), at 11-
14, U.N. Sales No. E.70V.5; see also R. WETZEL & D. RAUSCHNING, supra note 43. Other
supporters of the proposal included the delegations from India, Canada, and Switzerland. A
majority of the conference delegates was clearly convinced of the growing importance of
treaties involving international organizations, but apparently considered the time improper
for introducing such an amendment as it would have caused a signficant and intolerable
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ever, resolutely opposed any amendments to this effect, arguing
that the work of the conference would be significantly delayed, if
not fail completely.' 7
At this impasse, the Swedish delegate formulated a practical
compromise proposal: the conference would retain the present
draft article, and thus limit the scope of the future convention to
the law of treaties between the states, but at the same time adopt a
resolution formally requesting that the International Law Commis-
sion draft additional rules applicable specifically to treaties con-
cluded by international organizations.' 8 In this way, the conference
could proceed without further delay with its projected work sched-
ule. To the extent that the draft articles expressed existing cus-
tomary international law, they would be relevent both in the con-
clusion of international agreements and also where international
organizations or other subjects of international law were involved.4
The Swedish proposal obtained the general approval of the dele-
gates at the conference.6 0 Draft article I became, with minor altera-
tions, article I of the treaty."1 At the same time the conference
adopted, with eighty-five affirmative votes, zero negative votes, and
thirteen abstentions, the resolution suggested by the Swedish
delegate. 52
delay in the timing of the conference.
'" Official Records of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 46, at 11-
14.
48 Id.
4" Id. at 15.
"0 Id.
5 "Scope of the Present Convention: The Present Convention applies to treaties between
States." R. WErzEL & D. RAUSCHNING, supra note 43, at 45; see infra note 52 and accompa-
nying text.
Resolution relating to article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations, by its resolution
2166 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, referred to the Conference the draft articles con-
tained in chapter II of the report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its eighteenth session,
Taking note that the Commission's draft articles deal only with treaties con-
cluded between States,
Recognizing the importance of the question of treaties concluded between
States and international organizations or between two or more international
organizations,
Cognizant of the varied practices of international organizations in this respect,
and
Desirous of ensuring that the extensive experience of international organiza-
tions in this field be utilized to the best advantage,
Recommends to the General Assembly of the United Nations that it refer to the
International Law Commission the study, in consultation with the principal in-
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IV. CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LAW OF TREATIES: THE WORK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
With an explicit mandate from the General Assembly,53 the
Commission started its work on the codification of this second part
of the law of treaties. A special sub-commission discussed the sub-
ject during the 1970 session and Professor Paul Reuter was ap-
pointed Special Rapporteur in 1971. 54 Eleven reports were submit-
ted during the 1972 to 1982 period and were subjected to careful
study and extensive discussions within both the Commission and
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. The Commission
also consulted important international organizations.
In his initial report, the Special Rapporteur offered an overview
of the Commission's discussion of the law of treaties in general,
including an inventory of the specific problems inherent in the new
topic and a work schedule. 55 In 1973, the Commission gave its ap-
proval to the proposed schedule and requested that the Special
Rapporteur begin drafting a series of articles for a draft conven-
tion. The Commission approved a series of sixty draft articles dur-
ternational organizations [emphasis added] of the question of treaties concluded
between States and international organizations or between two or more interna-
tional organizations.
Official Records of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 46, at 178-79.
The phrase "in consultation with the principal international organizations" was inserted at
the request of Sweden. Id.
53
The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the International Law Commission on the work
of its twenty-first session,
Having discussed the resolution relating to article 1 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties,
Emphasizing the need for the further codification and progressive development
of international law in order to make it a more effective means of implementing
the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations and to give increased importance to its role in relations among
nations,
Recommends that the International Law Commission should study, in consulta-
tion with the principal international organizations, as it may consider appropriate
in accordance with its practice, the question of treaties concluded between States
and international organizations or between two or more international organiza-
tions, as an important question .. "
G.A. Res. 2501 (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp at 97, U.N. Doc. A/7630/1969.
I" The purpose of the "Sub-Commission Reuter," as it was called, was to make a prelimi-
nary study of the scope of the subject and a work plan for the Commission. Report of the
Sub-Commission Reuter, [19711 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/250.
55 Id.
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ing its 1979 session and sent the draft to states and international
organizations for comment. The completed draft text, consisting of
eighty articles and an annex, was approved in 1982 and forwarded
to the General Assembly.56
In the initial report, the Rapporteur, after a historical introduc-
tion on increased treaty-making by international organizations and
an extensive listing of the literature on the subject, 7 also formu-
lated two basic principles which became the points of departure for
this new codification effort. The first premise established that the
work on the codification of the law of treaties involving interna-
tional organizations is an extension of the codification of the gen-
eral law of treaties during the 1960's. s In practice, and historically,
the codification of the new law of treaties is a review and adapta-
tion of the 1969 treaty, which should form the basis and the points
of departure.5 9 Therefore, it is necessary to follow as closely as pos-
sible the structure and the terminology of the "mother treaty," and
to ensure that the two texts form "a body of law as homogeneous
as possible, particularly in terminology."60 The report's second pre-
mise stated, however, that the two texts should be independent of
one another.61 Thus, -the texts of identical articles would have to be
repeated in the new convention; a simple renvoi of corresponding
articles in the 1969 Convention would not be sufficient." A renvoi,
" Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations
or Between International Organizations, as Finally Approved by the International Law
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/37/402, at 3-42. For a detailed report on the work of the Commis-
sion on this topic, see the ILC Yearbooks 1973-1982, and the yearly reports on the sessions
of the Commission in the "ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC" and the
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; see 1979 Draft Articles, supra note 2.
17 The foundation of the United Nations, the 1949 Advisory Opinion of the International
Court, the creation of important regional organizations such as the EEC, and discussions
before and during the 1968-69 Vienna Conference have, in turn, led to a current of literature
on the subject of the status of international organizations. Specifically on their treaty-mak-
ing capacity and practice, see inter alia: K. ZEMANEK, AGREEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1971); S. HUNGDA CHIU,
THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CONCLUDE TREATIES AND THE SPECIAL LE-
GAL ASPECTS OF THE TREATIES SO CONCLUDED (1966); H.J. GEISER, "LES EFFETS DES ACCORDS
CONCLUS PAR LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES" (1977); S. DENYS, "L'NTERPRETATION DES
TRAITES DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES" (1981). See F. Seyerstedt, infra notes 84 and
93.
" Report of the Sub-Commission Reuter, supra note 54.
I9 d.
" 33 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n. at 8-11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/341 (1981).
'1 Id.
e, Id. at 8-11. In the past, the Commission has never used renvoi in its draft texts. Com-
pare for instance independent texts of respectively, the "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations," the "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations," the "Convention on Special
436 [Vol. 15:425
in any case, would cause complications in the event of amendments
to the earlier treaty.6 3 Additionally, complications could arise for
those states or organizations that were parties to the new but not
to the former convention. "'
The task of the Commission has proved surprisingly difficult.
The texts adopted by the Commission in the first reading seemed
unnecessarily cumbersome and designed to stress the difference
between states and organizations, rather than to reveal common
interests." Certain members apparently wished to demonstrate the
"inferiority" of international organizations to states, a conception
which also appears in the comments by states to the draft arti-
cles. 6 However, in the end reasonable compromises were made in
the face of insistent demands for simpler and more equitable rules;
earlier texts were drastically shortened and made more coherent,
while a distinction between states and international organizations
was maintained whenever real differences so required. The result is
that the two texts will be almost identical. The only term which
has different meanings is the term "treaty," which the 1969 Con-
vention defined as a "treaty between States."6 "
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE NEW LAW OF TREATIES
From the beginning of the Commission's work on the topic, it
became clear that this "new law of treaties" displayed specific
characteristics, sometimes fundamentally different from the law of
inter-state treaties.68 While the Commission usually attempted to
transfer the corresponding provisions from the 1969 Convention to
the new draft articles, basic difficulties sometimes had to be over-
come. The most important problems demanding a new and/or spe-
cific solution included: (1) the form of the treaties; (2) the question
of the representation of the organization; (3) the competence of in-
ternational organizations to enter into treaty-relationships, or in
other words, their "treaty-making capacity"; (4) the role played by
Missions," and the "Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations
with International Organizations of a Universal Character." These conventions have many
common provisions.
11 33 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n. at 8-11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/341 (1981).
e4 Id.
as See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 13 at 215; see also Official Records of the United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, done on May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/11/Add. 2 (1971); R. WETZEL & D. RAUSCHNING, supra note 43.
66 UNITED NATIONS, supra note 65.
617 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
a Report of the Sub-Commission Reuter, supra note 54, at 95.
1985] NEW LAW OF TREATIES 437
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the internal structures of the organization, that is, the question of
the relevant rules of the organization; (5) modes for dispute settle-
ment; and (6) legal consequences of such treaties with regard to
third states and, more specifically, to the member states of the par-
ticular organization.
This Article considers the general provisions of treaty law found
in the 1969 Convention. It then discusses specific requirements, as
well as suggested solutions pertaining to international organiza-
tions as formulated by the International Law Commission. The Ar-
ticle also considers the final solution proposed in the draft articles.
A. Treaty Form
From preliminary discussions it was generally understood that
the new subject would be limited to the question of "agreements
governed by international law and concluded in written form." 69
Oral or silent agreements would remain outside the scope of the
codification draft, a decision corresponding to provisions formu-
lated at the 1969 Convention. The 1969 Convention provides no
definition of what "written form" means and the Commission de-
cided to phrase the draft article similarly, perhaps because this
treatment leaves room for interpretation to accomodate the needs
of treaty-making international organizations. 1
B. Representation of International Organizations, Particularly
the Requirement of Proof of Full Powers of a Person Acting
for an International Organization in the Conclusion of Inter-
national Agreements
With regard to the representation of a state in the process of
negotiating and concluding a treaty, the 1969 Vienna Convention
distinguished persons who can be considered as representing their
state "in virture of their functions and without having to produce
full powers" from those persons who would have to produce full
powers.72 The general rule makes it clear that production of full
powers is normally required as a fundamental safeguard for negoti-
69 1982 Draft Articles, supra note 43, at 17.
70 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2. (use of terms), U.N. Doc. A/37/
402, reprinted in R. WETZEL & D. RAUSCHNING, supra note 43, at 45.
71 Chapter II of the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
thirty-fourth session, supra note 43, including the final version of the draft articles, has
been re-issued for the 1986 conference as U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 129/4.
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 7 (full powers), U.N. Doc. A/37/402,
reprinted in R. WETZEL & D. RAUSCHNING, supra note 43, at 46.
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ating states; however, in virture of their function and without hav-
ing to produce full powers, heads of state, heads of government,
and ministers of foreign affairs are considered as representing their
state for all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.7 3 Represent-
atives accredited by states to an international conference or to an
international organization or one of its organs enjoy the same pow-
ers, but only for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty within
the framework of that conference, organization, or organ.74
In the new law of treaties, the problem of the requirement of
producing full powers is of a different nature. According to existing
practice, representatives of international organizations normally do
not produce full powers; there is usually no doubt who is the high-
est official. On the other hand, it may be argued that whenever
representatives of organizations participate in negotiations with
representatives of states, maintaining some kind of equal treat-
ment would be important. Thus, the Commission set out to pre-
pare a draft for an article corresponding with article 7 of the 1969
draft articles.7 '5 In the course of the discussions, however, it became
extremely difficult to draft rules applicable to international organi-
zations under all circumstances. The Commission decided to limit
its draft to a general reference to "the practice of international or-
ganizations. ' '7 6 Practice, with regard to the first part of the treaty
as well as to the second part, refers to the adoption and authenti-
cation of the treaty-text.77 For the second part, however, concern-
ing the expression of consent to be bound by the treaty, the draft
articles refer to the practice of "the competent organs of the organ-
ization. '78 The commentary indicates that the Commission dis-
cussed the possibility of equating the powers of the highest official
of an organization with the powers of heads of state or government
for the purpose of negotiating treaties.7 9 The commentary, how-
73 Id.
74 Id.
71 See id.; Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at -, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 169, at 178, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (commentaries on articles).
7' Article 7(4)(6), 1982 Draft Articles, supra note 43, at 25.
77 Id. art. 7(3)(a) & (b).
71 Id. art. 7(4)(b).
79
... it is well established that as far as treaties of the United Nations are con-
cerned, in nearly every case it is the Secretariat that represents the Organization
at all stages, including the negotiating stage, and the establishment of the Organi-
zation's consent to be bound. In exceptional cases, . . . formal approval has been
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ever, also noted that there is no clear evidence of a continuous,
established, and universally accepted practice in this regard.80
There are developments, however, and in some organizations, such
as the Council of Europe, such a practice already exists. It seems
too early, though, to justify the assumption of complete equality
solely on the text of a draft article.8
Inquiry should also be made into the legal consequences of ultra
vires acts performed by a person representing an organization.
More specifically, what are the consequences if it later becomes
clear that a representative overstepped his mandate and did not
have the competence to negotiate and to conclude treaties for the
organization? Article 46 of the 1969 Convention established the
principles that a state may not invoke the defense that its consent
to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provi-
sion of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of funda-
mental importance in its internal law.8 2 The presumption is incon-
testable that certain office-holders are ex officio entitled to bind
the state, without the need to produce full powers. The Permanent
Court of International Justice upheld this presumption in the
Eastern Greenland case,83 finding that certain statements by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs had a binding effect on the government
of Norway, notwithstanding constitutional restrictions on his
competence. 4
There is no reason why this basic presumption could not be
maintained in the case of certain officials of international organiza-
tions, and why legal consequences of acts performed ultra vires
should be different from the consequences of such acts performed
by representatives of states. That same presumption is indeed
maintained in draft article 7, which makes distinctions similar to
expressed by an intergovernmental organ of the United Nations but in nearly all
other cases, including headquarters agreements ... no formal action was taken by
any intergovernmental organ either before or after the treaty had been established
as authentic and definitive ...
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339/Add. 5, at 4 (commentary to the draft article); see also supra note 6.
80 See 33 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n. at app. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339/Add, 5.
81 See Report of the Commission, supra note 43, at 46-52 (commentary).
82 See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 65, at 228.
83 PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 91-92.
84 See F. Seyerstedt, International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations: Its
Scope and Its Validity vis-a-vis Non-members, 14 INT'L J. LEGAL INFOR. 233-64 (1964), and
Do the Capacities Really Depend on the Constitutions?, 18 INT'L J. LEGAL INFOR. 27-28
(1968).
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article 7 of the 1969 Convention. 5 Draft article 7 should be read in
conjunction with draft article 27(2) and (3),8e as well as draft arti-
cle 46(3) and (4).7
C. Treaty-Making Capacity
Article 6 of the 1969 Convention confirms the prevailing opinion
that "every state possesses the capacity to conclude treaties."88
During the discussions of the Vienna Conference, several delegates
remarked that there was no need for the inclusion of this provision
since the capacity of states to conclude treaties was an essential
attribute of sovereignty and international legal personality. On the
other hand, because the Convention contained many other provi-
sions which merely restated existing law, article 6 was retained in
the definitive text.
In contrast to the relative ease with which agreement was
reached on the treaty-making capacity of states, agreement on the
treaty-making capacity of international organizations proved more
difficult. Notwithstanding the fundamental inequality between in-
ternational organizations, it could perhaps have been possible to
outline certain basic principles with respect to their treaty-making
capacity if the scope of those principles could be limited to a small
group of the most important global organizations. The Interna-
tional Law Commission, however, considered it essential to draft
rules which would apply to all international organizations, even
those to which such a capacity is not expressly given in their con-
8" See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 65, at 217; see also Draft Article 7, 1982 draft articles,
supra note 43, at 24-25.
" Draft article 27 corresponds with provisions found in article 27 of the 1969 Convention,
and reads: "An international organization party to a treaty may not invoke the rules of the
organization as justification for its failure to perform the treaty." Article 27(2), 1982 Draft
Articles, supra note 43, at 38; cf. article 27 of the 1967 Convention, reprinted in UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 65, at 223.
87 Draft article 46 corresponds with article 46 of the 1969 Convention and states in perti-
nent part:
3. An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organization
regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance.
4. In the case of paragraph 3, a violation is manifest if it is or ought to be within
the knowledge of any contracting state or any contracting organization.
Draft article 46, 1982 Draft Articles, supra note 43, at 51; cf. UNITED NATIONS, supra note
65, at 228.
" See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 65, at 217; R. WETZEL & D. RAUSCHNING, supra note
43, at 93.
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stitution and those that do not need such capacity. With this as
the goal, it becomes almost impossible to define general rules. The
main question became whether an international organization, for
the purpose of the draft articles, should be defined as "any organi-
zation with treaty-making capacity."8 9
With respect to the practice of international organizations, there
appears to be great flexibility, as may be deduced from the com-
ments of organizations consulted by the Commission:
1. The United Nations refers to a constant practice of "continu-
ous expansion of the number and subject areas of treaties to
which the UN has been or is a party [that] has occurred without
an express provision in the constitutive instrument - the Char-
ter of the United Nations - granting the organization the capac-
ity to enter into treaties for the general purpose of carrying out
the task entrusted to it . .. ;90
2. The Council of Europe, stating that nothing in its constitu-
tion provides for a treaty-making capacity, refers to numerous
agreements concluded by the Secretary-General "solely on his
own responsibility . . . ." The agreements in question were pri-
marily agreements of cooperation, exchanges of information and
documents, and forms of liaison with other organizations. The
Council of Europe also refers to a 1951 Resolution of the Coun-
cil's Committee of Ministers by which the Committee declared it-
self competent to enter into treaties with other international or-
ganizations on questions falling within its competence;9
3. The European Community explicitly states that "the com-
munity's treaty-making powers are not restricted to the instances
explicitly provided for in the treaty establishing the European
Economic Community. These powers may be extended in new
fields under the conditions provided for in the Treaty . . .,,"
Under those circumstances, the Commission decided to limit the
draft to outlining basic principles of international law concerning
the treaty-making capacity of international organizations. It was
considered of utmost importance to create a system flexible enough
to meet future needs. Thus, the text of draft article 6 provides that
"the capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties
89 A subsidiary question concerned the type of organizations such a definition would in-
clude. More specifically, would this be limited only to organizations with an express provi-
sion to this effect in their constitutions, or would it include all organizations whose constitu-
tions do not contain provisions to the contrary?
90 33 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339/Add. 5 (1981).
" 34 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comrn'n. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/350 (1982).
'2 33 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339 (1981).
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is governed by the relevant rules of that organization," leaving it to
the organizations to chart their present and future needs.93
D. Relevant Rules of the Organization
The Commission separately and thoroughly studied the question
of what should be considered the relevant rules of the organiza-
tion.94 This problem is fundamental for any discussion on the ex-
ternal relations of international organizations. It seemed logical to
transfer the notion of state internal law to the law of organizations.
Traditionally, however, the Commission stressed the importance of
the basic inequality of the various organizations and strived toward
respect for special circumstances and individual characteristics
whenever possible. 95 This principle has prevailed in all discussions
on the legal status of international organizations in the past and is
also currently at issue.
The phrase "relevant rules of that organization" repeatedly ap-
pears in the draft articles.9" Definition of the phrase in draft article
2 9 is based on a definition previously conceived in the 1975 Vienna
Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations
with International Organizations of a Universal Character. " From
the preparatory work on this convention, apparently the Commis-
" Draft art. 6, 1982 Draft Articles, supra note 43, at 23. But see, on draft article 6, F.
Seyerstedt, Treaty-Making Capacity of Intergovernmental Organizations: Article 6 of the
ILC's Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organiza-
tions or between International Organizations, 34 OSTERR. Z. OFF. RECHT U. VOLKERRECHT,
2/3, at 261-67 (1983). The author maintains that this provision in draft article 6 is "useless
and misleading" and should be deleted because draft article 46 (3) and (4), read in connec-
tion with draft article 27, discussed above, explicitly forbids that international organizations
invoke their internal rules as justification for their failure to perform the treaty. He argues
rather that the treaty-making capacity of international organizations does not flow from
their constitution or other relevant rules, but from general international law, in the same
way as is the case with states. He would propose a draft article 6 in accordance with the
principle that all international organizations have the capacity to conclude treaties unless
their constitution expressly limits this capacity with external effect vis-a-vis the other
parties.
" See Commentary to draft art. 6, 1982 Draft Articles, supra note 43, at 23-24.
95 Id.
" See, e.g., 1982 Draft Articles, art. 6, supra note 43, at 23.
, 1982 Draft Articles, art. 2(1)(f), supra note 43, at 18.
" Article 1 provides that "rules of the Organization means, in particular, the constituent
instruments, relevant decisions and resolutions, and established practice of the Organiza-
tion." Art. 1, Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character (Vienna, March 14, 1975), Official
Records of the United Nations Conference of the Representation of States in Their Rela-
tions with International Organizations, vol. II, Documents of the Conference, at 210, U.N.
Sales No. E.75.V.12.
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sion disfavored the idea of equating the constitution of an organi-
zation with its own texts and decisions.9 9 Granting an equivalent
status to international organization, however, seemed to meet the
recognized needs and demands and to accord with actual practice
of international organizations; thus it became a part of the text.100
According to the Commission's interpretation, not every constitu-
tional provision, not all resolutions and decisions, and not all ex-
amples of existing practice constitute the rules of an organization,
but rather only those relevant to a certain situation - the so-
called "relevant rules."10 1
E. Dispute Settlement
The draft articles, as approved by the Commission in 1982, led
to difficult discussions on two major points during the last session.
One problem that developed concerned settlement of disputes per-
taining to certain provisions of the convention. Article 66 of the
1969 convention provides for the settlement of two types of dis-
putes. First, disputes concerning the application or interpretation
of articles 53 and 64, the jus cogens provisions, are submitted by
written application to the International Court of Justice unless the
parties by common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion.102 Second, parties to a dispute with respect to the application
or interpretation of the other articles of part V of the convention,
concerning the invalidity, termination, or suspension of treaty op-
eration, may initiate a special procedure, as provided in the annex
to the convention, by submitting a request to the Secretary-
General.103
These dispute resolution provisions cannot be transferred as
written to the new draft articles because international organiza-
tions do not have access to the International Court of Justice. The
solution selected by the Commission was analogous to the modes of
dispute settlement provided for in the 1982 Convention on the
"' Id. at vol. I, p. 316.
'00 1982 Draft Articles, art. 5, supra note 43, at 23.
1"' Report of the Commission, supra note 43, at 36-37. The Commission's commentary
refers, for example, to the practice of abstentions in the voting procedure of the United
Nations Security Council, as analyzed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibi, (1971) I.C.J. 16, at 22, para. 22.
'o' See Draft art. 66, UNITED NATIONS, supra note 65, at 233.
103 Id.
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Law of the Sea. 104 Overriding resistance from the eastern European
states, 10 5 the Commission decided that parties to a dispute con-
cerning the application or interpretation of the two jus cogens arti-
cles should, by written notification to the other party or parties to
the dispute, submit to arbitration in accordance with the provi-
sions of the annex attached to the draft articles. As an alternative,
the parties by common consent could agree to submit the dispute
to an alternative arbitration procedure." 6 The annex establishes an
Arbitral Tribunal as well as a Conciliation Commission to settle
disputes arising in connection with the other articles of part V of
the draft articles, in the same manner as provided for in the 1969
Convention.10 7
F. Legal Consequences of Treaties Involving International Orga-
nizations with Regard to Third States and, More Specifi-
cally, to the Member States of the Organization in Question
One question debated at length in the 1982 session remained un-
resolved. The question involved the legal consequences of treaties
concluded by international organizations with regard to third
states and, more specifically, the legal consequences for member
states of the organization. Draft article 36, entitled "Obligations
and Rights Arising for States Members of an International Organi-
zation From a Treaty to Which it is a Party," purportedly dealt
with this question 0 8 There is no corresponding article in the 1969
Vienna Convention.
The Commission noted that a de facto situation developed
which the Vienna Convention neither explicitly covered nor antici-
pated. For example, the Commission noted that "a customs union,
in the case where it takes the form of an international organiza-
tion, normally concludes tariff agreements to which its members
are not parties. Such tariff agreements would be pointless unless
they were to be immediately binding on member states. . . . [Or]
an international organization, before concluding a headquarters
agreement with a state, may wish its member states to agree
among themselves, and with the organization itself, beforehand so
"o See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), annex V & VII.
'05 See S. McCaffey, The 34th Session of the International Law Convention, 77 A.J.I.L.
232, at 327 (1983).
100 1982 Draft Articles, art. 66, supra note 43, at 64.
107 37 U.N. GAOR (Provisional Agenda Item 125) at 40-42, U.N. Doc. A/37/402 (1982).
100 See 1982 Draft Articles, arts. 34-38, supra note 43, at 42-48.
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as to establish, at least in part, some of the provisions of the head-
quarters agreement."10
9
The question is whether these situations call for special rules or
whether they fall within the scope of articles 34 through 37 of the
Vienna Convention. The Commission argues for the inclusion of
special provisions in the draft articles because in practice, the con-
sent of states who are members of the organization almost always
precedes the conclusion of the treaty by the organization, while the
general provision in draft article 35 seems to refer only to subse-
quent consent.110 The requirement of express written consent,
thus, should be more flexible in cases covered by draft article
36bis. Certain situations are too specific to be covered effectively
by general rules.
Several members of the Commission, however, disfavored inclu-
sion of specific provisions because the specific provisions apply
mainly in the case of treaties concluded by the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC); members considered it inopportune to
include provisions covering only special, even unique, situations
such as the case of the EEC.1 The same objections were voiced by
some member states during discussions in the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly. 1 2 The EEC had expressed its interest in
the inclusion of a provision such as draft article 36bis. In the com-
mentary on the draft articles, 1 the Commission maintained that
the text excluded indications that it would apply only to the EEC
and, indeed, as members of the Commission pointed out, the guar-
antees which the draft provided would apply to a number of orga-
nizations as a result.
This problem is a general one and arises in connection with an
international organization that enters into treaty relations with a
third state or with another international organization. The need
for a solution to the problem in the draft articles is inescapable.
The legal fiction that an international organization is an entity
separate and distinct from its member states should not be carried
to the extreme. The EEC is competent under international law to
conclude treaties which are binding on its institutions and on its
109 Id.
110 Id.
I S. McCaffey, supra note 105, at 325-26.
112 [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2, at 149.
113 Comments and Observations of Governments and Principal International Organiza-
tions, 33 U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n at 28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339 (1981).
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member states, as provided by article 228 of the EEC treaty. 114 Ar-
ticle 228 intends to give guarantees to non-member states that
they assent to and accept by entering into treaty relations with
organization. In this respect, article 228 is similar to article 27 of
the Vienna Convention, which provides that "a party may not in-
voke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty."'11 Draft article 36bis, thus, is of general
importance. 1 "
Although the EEC endorsed the principles embodied in draft ar-
ticle 36bis, it identified shortcomings in the text. In particular,
draft article 36bis fails to consider expressly the situation where an
international organization, together with its member states, con-
cludes a treaty with a third state or organization. In practice, this
situation will become more and more common, at least in the EEC
and in those areas within which the competence of the EEC is
comingled with the competence of its member states. This situa-
tion of "mixed agreements" is, by way of example, the situation
confronting a number of international commodity agreements 1 7
where the EEC has become a party to the agreement together with
its member states. The question has also arisen in the context of
possible participation by the EEC in the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention.
This last question involves the problem of participation of inter-
national organizations in multilateral conventions. Whenever inter-
national organizations enter into treaty relations,1 they almost al-
ways have done so through bilateral agreements. This could mean
that there are limits to the treaty-making capacity of international
organizations. Discussions of the general principles of the law of
treaties failed to distinguish between bilateral and multilateral
11 Treaty Establishing the European Communities, done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 297
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 228.
"' Id.
16 Comments and Observations of Governments and Principal International Organiza-
tions, Report of the Sec. Gen., 39 U.N. GAOR at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339 (1981).
I" The following International Commodity Agreements are mentioned: the 1971 Wheat
Agreement, the 1975 Cocoa Agreement, the 1975 Tin Agreement, the 1976 Coffee Agree-
ment, all including later amendments, and the 1979 Natural Rubber Agreement. On the
other hand, UNESCO, in its commentary on the draft articles, points out that in general
there has not been enough practice in this regard to justify codification at this stage. Report
of the Sec. Gen., 39 U.N. GAOR at 8, U.N. Doc. A/39/491 (1984).
"I Organizations have entered treaty relations in an increasing number; the EEC entered
into approximately eight hundred between 1958 and 1985. Statement by the Observer for
the EEC Commission in the General Assembly, December 1984.
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agreements; the special rapporteurs never alluded to such a dis-
tinction during the preparatory work on the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion. Nor does such a distinction appear in the text of the Conven-
tion. In practice, however, participation of international
organizations in general multilateral conventions has not been
readily accepted by participating states, and special clauses must
be inserted in the text of conventions to make such participation
possible. This question will be on the agenda of the 1986 Vienna
Conference, where a decision will be made on the subject of possi-
ble participation by international organizations in the Convention
on the New Law of Treaties.
The final version of draft article 36bis, as approved by the Com-
mission reads as follows:
Obligations and rights arise for states members of an interna-
tional organization from the provisions of a treaty to which that
organization is a party when the parties to the treaty intend those
provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and
according such rights and have defined their conditions and ef-
fects in the treaty or have otherwise agreed thereon, and if: (1)
the states members of the organization, by virtue of the constitu-
ent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unani-
mously agreed to be bound by the said provisions of the treaty,
and (b) the assent of the states members of the organization to be
bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly
brought to the knowledge of the negotiating states and negotiat-
ing organizations.'19
Member states of an international organization which enter into
treaty relationships thus incur certain legal consequences only
when several conditions are fulfilled: (1) the member states of the
organization in question unanimously consent to be bound by the
provisions of the treaty, which might cause separate legal obliga-
tions for individual member states; (2) the consent is brought to
the attention of all other negotiating partners; and (3) all other
negotiating partners also consent.
VI. THE DECISION TO CONVENE A CODIFICATION CONFERENCE IN
VIENNA IN 1986; SOME CONCLUSIONS
Following final approval of the draft articles by the Commission
in 1982, they were sent to the General Assembly. The new law of
.. 1982 Draft Articles, art. 36bis, supra note 43, at 43.
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treaties then became the responsibility of the General Assembly,
which faced the decision of how to transform the draft articles into
a treaty. It had at least two options: the General Assembly could,
after discussions, adopt the final draft in the form of a resolu-
tion,"O or it could convene a special conference for the negotiation
and adoption of the treaty.12'
In 1983, the General Assembly made the fundamental decision
that the most appropriate forum would be a conference of plenipo-
tentiaries. 22 After an official invitation by the Austrian govern-
ment, the General Assembly decided in 1984 to convene a confer-
ence of plenipotentiaries in Vienna from February 18 through
March 31, 1986, to negotiate, on the basis of the draft articles, the
final text of the Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States
and International Organizations or Between Two or More Interna-
tional Organizations.'23
During discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General As-
sembly, various representatives commented favorably on the draft
articles. Some, however, primarily eastern European states, re-
tained the opinion that the text failed to reflect sufficiently the
fundamental difference between the international legal capacity of
states and the legal capacity of international organizations. In the
opinion of these states, this fundamental difference remains sec-
ondary to and derivative from the concerted will of the states par-
ties to the constitution of a particular international organization.124
Other states, 2 5 however, held a different opinion. They regarded
the new convention as the second in a possible trilogy: the first was
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the second
was the proposed draft convention; and a third convention cover-
20 This approach was taken in the case of several other treaties. E.g., The International
Covenant on Economics, Social, and Cultural Rights, annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
12' As has happened in the case of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the
Sea, 1958 (Conferences of Geneva in 1958 and 1960) as well as in the case of the conventions
mentioned above on the status of international organizations and on the law of treaties
(Vienna Conferences of 1968/1969, 1975, 1978, etc.).
12 G.A. Res. A/38/139, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 273, U.N. Doc. - (1983). The
United States, Israel, and the Soviet Union, however, preferred action by less costly resolu-
tion rather than conference. See 38 U.N. GAOR c.6 (35th meeting) at 1-9, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
38/SR.35 (1983).
The conference was to be held in 1985 or later, as some time would be needed for prelimi-
nary consultations with member states and international organizations.
123 G.A. Res. A/38/779, - U.N. GAOR -, U.N. Doc. - (1974).
2 38 U.N. GAOR c.6 (35th meeting) at para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.35 (1983).
2 Thailand, for example.
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ing international agreements involving non-governmental organ-
izations.
Two fundamental problems remain unsolved in connection with
the upcoming conference. The first involves the identity of and ca-
pacity in which parties may participate in the conference. Whether
interested international organizations will be invited to take part
in the discussions on equal footing with the participating states
and whether they shall have the right to vote is unclear. During
discussions in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the
Greek representative, speaking on behalf of the member states of
the European Communities, expressed the view that international
organizations should be invited to the conference to allow them to
contribute to the codification effort most effectively. Their position
presumably would be an intermediate one between mere observers
and full participants. For such a plan to succeed, international or-
ganizations would have to be given the opportunity to take an ac-
tive part in the discussions and to propose amendments, although
they would not be accorded the right to vote. The second funda-
mental problem concerns who shall be entitled to become a party
to the future convention; that is, will it be possible for interna-
tional organizations to sign and ratify the convention? For this re-
sult to occur, special clauses must be inserted in the text.l2 6 It
might be argued that it is important, even essential, that the con-
vention enter into force only after the express consent of, or the
ratification by, certain major international organizations, but this
is a question for the conference to decide.
Other organizations, commenting on the draft articles, also have
pointed out the importance of their active participation in the con-
ference. 12 7 The European Communities, in the commentary to
draft article 9, stated that they generally support the proposed
draft, but cannot accede to the principle that states would decide
whether organizations would be invited to participate in the nego-
tiation of certain treaties and, if so, which organizations would be
invited. 128 This applies even more so, perhaps, to the upcoming
" Certain clauses in the Final Act of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
make it possible for international organizations that have been given a certain competence
in the field of the international relations of their member states (such as the European
Communities), to become a party to the convention.
117 E.g., UNESCO, Report of the Sec. Gen., 39 U.N. GAOR at 9, U.N. Doc. A/39/491
(1984).
'" U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/339, supra note 116, at 27. The Communities obtained the status of
observer in 1974; that means that a representative of the EEC is invited to participate in
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conference on the new law of treaties.
The decision on whom to invite to the 1986 Vienna Conference
nevertheless rested solely with the General Assembly. The resolu-
tion of the General Assembly invites: (1) all states; (2) Namibia; 129
(3) representatives of international organizations with a standing
invitation from the General Assembly to participate as observers in
the sessions and work of international conferences convened under
the auspices of the United Nations; 0 (4) representatives of the
national liberation movements recognized in their region by re-
gional organizations to participate as observers; 31 and (5) repre-
sentatives of international intergovernmental organizations that
traditionally have been invited as observers at legal codification
conferences convened by the United Nations to participate in a ca-
pacity to be considered and decided by the General Assembly at its
fortieth session.1 32 The conclusion must be that only states will be
allowed full participation in the conference, with the right to vote.
Even so, the conference represents a significant step in the de-
velopment of the law concerning international organizations and
their participation in international relations. The importance of
the work by the International Law Commission on this subject is
apparent from its use in the Advisory Opinion by the International
the work and in the discussions of the General Assembly, without the right to vote. In prac-
tice, this means most often the discussion in the Second and Fourth Committee.
129 Since 1966, the territory of Namibia, formerly Southwest Africa, has been under the
direct administration of the United Nations. The territory is represented by the United
Nations Council for Namibia.
'30 A number of intergovenmental organizations have obtained the status of observer.
They take part, on certain conditions but never with the right to vote, in meetings and
conferences of the United Nations. They include the important regional organizations (e.g.,
OAS, OAU, League of Arab States) and about seven others, such as the Commonwealth
Secretariat, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, and the Asian-African Le-
gal Consultative Committee. See N. SYBESMA-KNOL, supra note 6 (detailed analysis of the
various observers and the ways they participate in the work of the U.N.).
... Id. at chapters IX and X on the status of liberation movements.
132 For example, at the Vienna Convention of 1968/1969, the following organizations,
apart from the specialized agencies of the United Nations themselves, were represented by
an official delegation composed of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (which
at that time did not yet have the official status of observer): the International Bureau for
the Protection of Intellectual Property, the Council of Europe, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, and the League of Arab States. At the Conference on the Representation
of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character, in
1975, the Council of Europe, the EEC, and the League of Arab States were represented. At
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973-1982, a record number of organiza-
tions (some 19, apart from the specialized agencies), was represented. For an exhaustive
study of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, see M. VILLAGER, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES (1985).
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Court of Justice of December 20, 1980 on the Interpretation of the
Headquarters Agreement Between the World Health Organization
and Egypt. This interpretation repeatedly refers to article 56 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention and to "the corresponding provision
in the International Law Commission's draft articles on Treaties
Between States and International Organizations or Between Two
or More International Organizations.' '1 33
"' Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of March 25, 1951 between
the WHO and Egypt, (1980) I.C.J. 73, at paras. 47 & 49.
Editor's Note: Special Recognition is due to Narayana Rao Rarnpilla, who served faith-
fully as Graduate Research Editor on this article. His work is genuinely appreciated.
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